In his letter, Haji-Ioannou has also called for removal of easyJet’s Chief Finaicial Officer Andrew Findlay, after earlier calling for a board meeting on a vote to remove Andreas Bierwirth as a director, which was rejected by easyJet.
“If this 4.5 billion pound liability to Airbus is preserved – and not cancelled – by the easyJet board then, I regret to report, easyJet will run out of money around August 2020, perhaps even earlier,” the founder said in his letter.
“I will certainly not be throwing good money after bad. For the avoidance of doubt, I will not inject any fresh equity in easyJet whilst the Airbus liability is in place.”
He also stated that he will continue to call for the removal of more directors every time the company delays the vote.
He also wants easyJet to reduce its fleet size to 250 aircraft from 350, adding that the airline will not need any more additional new planes for many years to come.
(Reporting by Juby Babu in Bengaluru; editing by Diane Craft)
OTTAWA
(Reuters) – As Boeing Co and global airlines work to restore public
confidence in the 737 MAX after two deadly crashes, they will have a
play book they can use.
This
is not the first time that Boeing has faced a crisis after launching a
new plane with innovative technology. In 1965, three Boeing 727-100
passenger jets crashed in less than three months in the United States
while coming into land, killing a total of 131 people.
Like
the 737 MAX, the three-engined 727 was billed as one of the most
advanced aircraft of its time. Boeing introduced the 727 in 1964 and
portrayed it as a more efficient alternative to the standard four-engine
jets of the day, with new features designed to make the 727 easier to
operate from short airfields.
The
727’s wing flap system, which provides extra lift at low speeds, was
unusually large and sophisticated, which allowed the plane to descend
more quickly than other rivals and avoid buildings and other obstacles
close to runways.
Investigators
looking into the crashes discovered that some pilots did not fully
understand the flap system and were therefore allowing the planes to
descend at too great a speed.
“There was nothing wrong with the airplane… (but) if you didn’t really pay a lot of attention to it you could build up an immense sink rate,” said Bill Waldock, a professor of safety science at the U.S-based Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He uses the 727 accidents as part of a case study.
Aviation
authorities ordered more training for pilots but allowed the planes to
keep flying despite calls from some politicians to ground them.
Boeing made some modifications to the flight manual and to the procedures for flying the airplane on final approach.
In the case of the 737 MAX 8, Boeing is working on software and training updates. [L3N21C0FP]
Alan
Hoffman, a U.S. aviation historian and retired transportation lawyer
who has researched the 727 accidents, said given the publicity over the
recent crashes, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration would only
allow the 737 MAX 8 planes to fly again if the regulator is convinced
the fixes worked.
“The
airplane will go back into service and unless something else crops up
there will be no further problems and a year from now this will all be a
dim distant memory,” he predicted by phone from St Louis, Missouri.
Boeing was not immediately available for comment.
In
contrast to the swift grounding of the 737 MAX 8 after the recent
second accident, just two days after the third fatal 727 crash, in
November 1965, the Civil Aeronautics Board said there was no reason to
ground the plane.
“It
passed very rigid certification tests … before it was put into
service and nothing has turned up in our investigation to cause us to
doubt its stability,” the board said.
Those
words did not immediately reassure many travellers. Indeed, passengers
had started to boycott the airliner after the crashes began.
“For
a period of six months or so a lot of 727s were flying with half full
cabins,” Waldock said by phone from Prescott, Arizona. Still, the 727
crisis passed.
The
plane eventually became one of Boeing’s best sellers and was in
widespread use for another 30 years. By 2003, virtually all had been
retired as airlines moved away from the 727’s loud and thirsty engines.
(Reporting by David Ljunggren; editing by Joe White and Cynthia Osterman)
